I am reading Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War. The clarity of the text surprises me—perhaps due to the skill of Thucydides or the translator.
Nonetheless, you could exercise your strategic thought through the chapter on the Athenian decision to choose between Corcyra and Corinth.
I hold the Athenian perspective in this writing.
Some quotes
Before I start, here are some interesting quotes.
Thucydides analyzing a conflict: “…it was a battle where courage and sheer strength played a greater part than scientific methods…” This is an epic line.
Thucydides: “On their voyage home the Corinthians took Anactorium, at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. It was a place in which both Corinth and Corcyra had rights and it was given up to the Corinthians by treachery. Before sailing home the Corinthians put settlers of their own into Anactorium. They sold 800 Corcyraean prisoners who were slaves, and they kept in captivity 250 whom they treated with great consideration, hoping that a time would come when they would return and win over the island to Corinth. Most of them were in fact people of great power and influence in Corcyra.”
- I am probably misunderstanding something here. But supposing I did understand, it is an interesting strategy by the Corinthians to garnish and ingratiate the 250 influential people they captured in Corcyra to win Corcyra back to Corinth. It is like giving these influential individuals a second chance in life, in which case, the prisoners “thank” Corinth by sparing them via winning Corcyra over. Again, I am probably misunderstanding something here. But it is an interesting strategy. 250 influential people are bargaining chips.
Neutrality
From the Corcyraeans: “We used to think that our neutrality was a wise thing, since it prevented us being dragged into danger by other people’s policies; now we see it clearly as a lack of foresight and as a source of weakness.”
That quote is interesting because people speak of the benefits of remaining neutral in scenarios of two terrible options. You could have two friends in a heated debate about tea and coffee. Choosing one irritates the other; hence, remaining neutral would, in theory, avoid irritating both sides. Or, what could also happen, in theory, is disappointing both by choosing neutrality: you chose your own side, pre-workout in this case, irritating both sides. But still, whether coffee, tea, or pre-workout, the matter is insignificant. You will all still be good friends.
Neutrality may sound clever and may make sense when the stakes are low.
The logic of neutrality changes when the stakes are higher. I believe it was Niccolo Machiavelli who said along the lines that taking the middle ground—neutrality in this case—means disappointing both sides of an argument, in which case, you have made two enemies instead of one. Neutrality may have benefits in the short term but little long-term gains. Neutrality looks like the winning move until war cascades into your own region. A country that remains neutral makes two enemies, not zero. A country choosing a side chooses one enemy. So, the more ferocious a matter, the deadlier neutrality may become—the strategic thinker will weigh it all in his own terms.
Onto the main text.
Corcyra
What I like about the Corcyraen argument is that the ambassadors spoke deeply in favor of Athens, while Corinth was more of a warning akin to Big Stick thinking.
The rough context here is that Corcyra had always remained neutral and did not seek allies. They believed that neutrality prevented them from countless wars. However, Corcyra realized that the principle of neutrality was a mistake, as they had no allies to draw upon for help.
The Corcyraen argument roughly goes as the following (any mistake is my own):
Athens would side with the victim. By helping Corcyra, the victim, Corcyra would be in great debt to Athens, which Athens could use to its own benefit.
Corcyra has the second-largest navy, behind Athens. If Athens sided with Corcyra, the second-largest navy would be allies to Athens. With the Corcyraen navy, Athens would not need to construct new ships, saving them money and gaining speed.
- That the three notable navies are Corcyra, Corinth, and Athens. If Corinth conquered Corcyra, Athens would face the combined navies of Corcyra, Corinth, and the Peloponnese.
Sparta is afraid of Athens and seeks to annihilate it as a threat. Corinth, who is influential in Sparta, plans to conquer Corcyra and then attack Athens with the newly combined forces. By preventing Corinth from taking Corcyra, I suspect the assumption here is that Corinth would think twice about influencing Sparta to attack Athens.
- That Corinth is distrustful because they treat their subject, Corcyra, to war.
- That helping Corcyra is not in violation of the peace treaty Athens has with Sparta because of the previous Cocyraen principle of remaining neutral.
- That even if it were in violation of the peace treaty, aligning with Corcyra, which has the second-largest navy, would make Athens stronger if a war started between Athens and Sparta. Rejecting the alliance would mean that Athens would remain as it is.
- That because Sparta is fearful because war between Athens and Sparta is inevitable.
- That Corcyraen’s enemies are the same as Athenian enemies, implying that Corcyra will help Athens deal with such enemies because their interests align.
- That Corcyra occupies an important geographical link to Italy and Sicily, thus preventing a naval attack from Sparta from that area.
What I like about the Cocyraen argument is how they spoke in favor of Athens. That sounds like a no-brainer that you should speak for the benefit of those you wish to influence. But I do believe that simple tactic is often forgotten at the individual level where people think about themselves instead of others. For some reason—perhaps it is because I am young, and therefore, the set of people I interact with are also young—people my age do not speak in favor of others for persuasion.
I think much of today’s persuasion among individuals comes from a position of weakness: “You should help me because I am weak and ill-supplied.”
Another attempt at persuasion is to follow rules, like tit-for-tat: “I have done This for you. You should do That for me.”
And a third common attempt at persuasion is the requirement argument: “I excel at This and That. So it makes sense to put me in a better position.”
Sure, those are valid persuasion attempts in their given context. But such attempts lack a strong why for the other side. Speaking in favor of people raises one’s case because both sides benefit. But I always see the selfish side—of one person attempting to persuade others by speaking only to their own benefit. Perhaps such thinking will change once I get older and begin dealing with those who have gained far more experience in negotiation. Regardless, speaking in favor of others, I suspect, wins the hearts of others.
Corinth
The Corinthian arguments serve more as a warning to Athens.
- That Corcyraen’s neutrality gave Corcyra independence to justify wrongdoings. Meaning, that if Corcyra had done wrong against another city, Corcyra—because of its principle of neutrality—would be its own judge and would hardly ever admit themselves to anything wrong in its own courts.
- That, indeed, Corcyraens are colonists from Corinthians. The fact that Corcyra is at war with Corinth shows Corcyra’s disloyalty for Corinth, while other Corinthian colonists respect Corinth and are loyal to Corinth.
- That the reason Corcyra is coming to speak to the Athenians is convenient for Corcyra. If Corcyra really wanted an alliance, they should have done so before the war over Epidamnus instead of after.
- That Athens has a peace treaty with Corinth, and that by helping Corcyra, Athens is breaking the treaty.
- That Corinth had helped Athens in the past but Corcyra had not. For instance, Corinth had not voted against Athens on whether stronger powers should control their allies. Another: Corinth gave Athens 20 ships to conquer Aegina, which prevented Peloponnesian states from helping Samos.
- That Corinth could persuade Sparta to go to war with Athens sooner rather than later.
Where Corcyra spoke in favor of Athens, the Corinthian rhetoric rests more on coercion. My question would be the following: what if Corinth also spoke in favor of Athens? Would that make a difference?
In other words, knowing that it is necessary to persuade the other party, is it wise to wave a stick in front of their faces or to hold out a helping hand? Naturally, all negotiations at the national level depend on the context that brought forth the negotiations in the first place, so all tactics and strategies are on the table, even coercive and violent means (specifically violent parties). But coercing people sows the seed for betrayal in the long term unless, of course, you design terms that deter such betrayal. And that it is probably even wiser to avoid being in a violent position in the first place.
Analyzing potential outcomes
Now, this part interests me because, at some level, we are witnessing what Athenian leaders faced. I find it interesting to consider the possibilities.
- Athens sides with Corcyra but loses
- Not only would Athens and Corcyra lose some of their ships and hoplites, but Athens would have accelerated the beginnings of war against Corinth and the Peloponnese in a weaker position.
- Athens sides with Corcyra and wins
- Athens would gain the second-largest navy. Because Athens viewed the war between itself and the Peloponnese as inevitable, Athens would have a larger military force upfront without spending money and time building ships. Additionally, it could deter the Peloponnese from attacking soon, so Athens would gain time to bolster their military forces, industries, and alliances.
- Athens sides with Corinth and loses
- Corcyra would win. But who cares? Corcyra would return to their principle of neutrality because— from the Corinthian arguments—Corcyra remained neutral to take advantage of their own justice system against other cities. In other words, it is likely that other cities do not like Corcyra because Corcyra will cheat other cities.
- Additionally, Corinth and the Peloponnese would remember that Athens sided with them, not with Corcyra.
- Athens sides with Corinth and wins
- Here, Athens could potentially use Corinth to dissuade Sparta from attacking Athens. After all, Athens helped a Peloponnesian city. By helping a Peloponnesian state, Athens could show that it is not willing to break the peace treaty and is actually looking to build a relationship with the Peloponnese.
Based on the four decisions and their possible effects, siding with Corinth seems best. For instance, if Athens sides with Corinth, either Winning or Losing would place Athens in a better long-term position. Winning with the Corinthians means Athens could possibly prolong the peace between Athens and the Peloponnese. Losing with the Corinthians still means that Athens sided with the Peloponnese, not against.
If Athens chose Corcyra, it must Win. Losing with Corcyra would put Athens in a worse position while losing with Corinth would not.
Athens Chooses Corcyra
In the end, Athens sides with Corcyra but in a defensive posture, and they win. Athens took a defensive posture because the Athenians did not want to break their peace treaty with the Peloponnese. And because Athens is not actively engaging but only defending an ally, it is not violating the treaty.
Athens sees the war as inevitable. So, they sought to diminish the navies as the opportunity arose. A classic move in strategy games: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. For those who are familiar with Civilization 5, it is akin to bribing smaller nations to attack bigger nations to diminish the resources of the bigger nation so that you have better odds of conquering the bigger nation AND reduce your losses from their diminished resources, essentially attack your enemy at their weakest when you are at your strongest.
Whether that is seen as such by the Peloponnese is up to the Peloponnese.
But given the simple possibilities, I believe that to be a strategic error. Why risk the acceleration war? If instead Athens appeased Corinth, Athens could use Corinth to appease Sparta.
Perhaps Athens could strike a deal with Corinth and the Peloponnese that would slow the inevitable war, giving Athens more time to build up its strength. At the same time, that would also give time for the Peloponnese to build up its strength, but in this case, the Athenians had the advantage of scale: they had more allies.
Even if Athens and Corinth lost the battle, Corcyra would not have that much leverage against Athens or Corinth and the Peloponnese because Corcyra would have remained neutral. Does that mean Corcyra will risk declaring war against Athens and Corinth the next time? No. Who would Corcyra have but themselves?
Another angle
There are other paths forward for Athens. First, we must understand that the Athenians believed war against Sparta and the Peloponnese was inevitable. By holding that perspective as the basis, we could see potential ideas that may deter the war.
Perhaps Athens could have used Corinth to open better relations to Sparta. For instance, Athens, at least based on Thucydides in this specific chapter of the book, did not negotiate their own terms with Corinth. For instance, Athens could have said to Corinth: “We will help you. But in exchange, you must persuade Sparta to open up trade relations.” By having Corinth open trade relations between Athens and Sparta, Athens could ease into the strategy of, “Marry our leaders and we marry yours. Or let us build schools there and you could build schools here.” Whatever the strategy, we must sow dependency into both nations. That way, Athens could not exist without Sparta, and Sparta could not exist without Athens. By any means, the goals must deepen dependency on one another.
Athens must not forget about Corinth, too. Athens could speak in favor of Corinth, saying that by opening up relations, Athens could also extend trade benefits to Corinth. “Athens is known to be wealthy and live luxurious lives in comparison to other cities. Corinth could enjoy the same wealth and luxurious lives if they but persuade Sparta not to go to war.”
Another idea:
- I am recalling what I have learned at school about Sparta. Sparta was a massive slave-ruling nation. Perhaps Athens could enjoy cheap labor from Sparta (Yes, I know that slavery is bad; I am merely speaking in the context of that era). Athens could get cheap food, for instance, whereas Sparta could get to purchase Athenian luxuries.
Also recalling from school:
- Sparta was afraid of the growth of Athenian powers, specifically the Athenian’s ability to attain allies and bolster their allies’ forces. Such build-up of power creates fear among neighboring cities. So, Athens and Sparta could have negotiated the neutrality of their allies. For instance, both Athens and Sparta must break away from their current alliances to do away with the accumulation of power. How likely are they to break away from their alliances? I would not be surprised if part of the answer begins with trade or rapid armaments for all nearby nations.
However, that comes with a risk: the Persians might just declare war on all the cities and pluck them one by one, which brings us to a third possibility.
Athens and Sparta could negotiate the union of their allies and embed their markets to make both of them reliant on one another. Perhaps even embedding their societies together by having their leaders’ children marry one another, accumulating those social ties, where once the children are in power and start families of their own, they are less likely to destroy one another, serving as conduits for peace, using Persia as a unifying enemy.
A fourth possible angle:
- Now, I haven’t finished the book. However, based on what I was taught about Athens, Athens excelled at math, literature, and philosophy, while Sparta was renowned for its warriors. Perhaps that could have been a negotiation card for Athens, teaching Sparta to improve itself.